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https://assets.documentcloud.o ... o.pdfЦитата:
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE
SUBJECT: Achieving Full Combat Capability with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is at
Substantial Risk
Цитата:
Close Air Support (CAS). The F-35A in the Block 3i configuration has numerous
limitations which make it less effective overall at CAS than most currently-fielded fighter
aircraft like the F-15E, F-16, F-18 and A-10 in a permissive or low-threat environment, which is
where CAS is normally conducted. The following observations are consistent with the Air Force
IRA report:
The limited weapons load of two bombs (along with two missiles for self-defense)
constrains the effectiveness of the Block 3i F-35A for many CAS missions. Compared to
a legacy fighter with multiple weapons on racks, and multiple weapons types per aircraft,
the limited Block 3i load means that only a limited number and type of targets can be
effectively attacked.
No gun capability. An aircraft-mounted gun is a key weapon for some CAS scenarios
when a bomb cannot be used due to collateral damage concerns or when the enemy is
“danger close” to friendly troops. The gun can also be an effective weapon for attacking
moving targets. However, even though an internal gun is installed in the Block 3i F-35A,
it cannot be used until significant modifications to both the gun system and aircraft are
completed, along with a version of Block 3F software that supports weapons delivery
accuracy (WDA) testing with the gun. For these reasons, gun WDA testing, with the
required modifications and software, has slipped to the fall of 2016, at the soonest.
Limited capability to engage moving targets. Even though the Block 3i F-35A does not
have a functioning gun, it can carry the GBU-12 laser guided bomb which can be used
against moving targets. However, Block 3i does not have an automated targeting
function with lead-laser guidance (i.e., automatically computing and positioning the laser
spot proportionately in front of the moving target to increase the likelihood of hitting the
target) to engage moving targets with the GBU-12, like most legacy aircraft that currently
fly CAS missions. Lead-laser guidance is currently not planned for Block 3F. Instead, F35 pilots can only use basic rules-of-thumb when attempting to engage moving targets
with the GBU-12, resulting in very limited effectiveness. Also, limitations with cockpit
controls and displays have caused the pilots to primarily use two-ship “buddy lasing” for
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GBU-12 employment, which isn’t always possible during extended CAS engagements
when one of the aircraft has to leave to refuel on a tanker.
Voice communications are sometimes required to validate digital communications.
Problems with Variable Message Format (VMF) and Link-16 data link messaging –
including dropped/hidden information or incorrect formats – sometimes require pilots to
use work-arounds by validating or “reading back” information over the radio that prevent
them from conducting digital (only) CAS, a capability that is common in most legacy
CAS aircraft.
Limited night vision capability. Although Lot 7 and later aircraft are fielded with the
Gen III HMDS, which has shown improvement to the deficiencies with the earlier Gen II
HMDS, limitations with night vision capability remain. Pilots using the Gen III helmet
for night operations report that visual acuity is still less than that of the night vision
goggles used in legacy aircraft, which makes identification of targets and detecting
markers more difficult, if not impossible. Also, “green glow” – a condition where light
leakage around the edge of the display during low-light conditions makes reading the
projected information difficult – is improved over the Gen II HMDS, but is still a concern
during low ambient illumination conditions. Finally, accuracy testing of the gun with the
HMDS has not yet been completed, although the testing is planned for late CY16.
Hence, the aiming accuracy of the combined HMDS and windscreen are still unproven
for both air-to-air and air-to-ground gun employment.
Lack of marking capability – a key capability for both Forward Air Controller-Airborne
(FAC-A) and CAS missions. Legacy CAS platforms can mark targets with rockets,
flares, and/or infrared (IR) pointers, none of which are currently available on the F-35.
The F-35 has a laser designator as part of its Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS),
but the laser is used for targeting from ownship when using the GBU-12 laser guided
bomb or to “buddy-guide” a weapon from another aircraft. This limitation is not planned
to be fixed during SDD.
Reduced on-station time and greater reliance on tanker aircraft. Although this limitation
is not unique to the Block 3i configuration, the F-35has high fuel burn rates and slow air
refueling rates that extend air refueling times and decrease overall on-station time which
may impact mission effectiveness.
The Air Force IRA had similar observations on CAS limitations and concluded that the
Block 3i F-35A does not yet demonstrate equivalent CAS capabilities to those of 4th
generation aircraft.
Other mission areas. In addition to the Block 3i limitations listed above that affect the
CAS mission area, the following inherent Block 3i limitations will also affect the capability of
the F-35A in other mission areas:
Poor geolocation capability against certain types of emitters and threat laydowns.
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No standoff weapon. With only direct attack bombs, the F-35 in the Block 3i
configuration will be forced to fly much closer to engage ground targets and, depending
on the threat level of enemy air defenses and acceptable mission risk, it may be limited to
engaging ground targets that are defended by short-range air defenses or none at all.
The limited weapons loadout of the Block 3i F-35 makes effective prosecution of many
expected types of targets in a typical theater a challenge.
Pilots report that inadequacies in Pilot Vehicle Interfaces (PVI) and deficiencies in the
Tactical Situation Display (TSD) continue to degrade battlespace awareness and increase
pilot workload. Workarounds to these deficiencies are time-consuming and detract from
the efficiency and effectiveness of mission execution.
Block 3i has significant deficiencies that must still be addressed. In addition to the
limitations listed above, Block 3i also has hundreds of other deficiencies, the most significant of
which must be fixed in Block 3F to realize the full warfighting capability required of the F-35.
These deficiencies include, but are not limited to the following:
Avionics sensor fusion performance is still unacceptable.
- Air tracks often split or multiple tracks are created when all sensors contribute to
the fusion solution. The workaround during early developmental testing was to
turn off some of the sensors to ensure multiple tracks did not form, which is
unacceptable for combat and violates the basic principle of fusing contributions
from multiple sensors into an accurate track and clear display to gain situational
awareness and to identify and engage enemy tracks.
- Similarly, multiple ground tracks often are displayed when only one emitter threat
is operating. In addition, tracks that “time out” and drop from the display cannot
be recalled, causing pilots to lose tactical battlefield awareness.
- Sharing tracks over the Multi-Aircraft Data Link (MADL) between aircraft in the
F-35 formation multiplies the problems described above.
- The Air Force IRA report also identified deficiencies with fusion in Block 3i.
Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities, including electronic attack (EA), are inconsistent
and, in some cases, not effective against required threats.
- Although the details of the deficiencies are classified, effective EW capabilities
are vital to enable the F-35 to conduct Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air
Defenses (SEAD/DEAD) and other missions against fielded threats.
- The Air Force IRA report also identified significant EW deficiencies in Block 3i.
Datalinks do not work properly. Messages sent across the MADL are often dropped or
pass inaccurate off-board inter-flight fusion tracks based on false or split air tracks and
inaccurate ground target identification and positions.
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Mission data development, optimization, and operationally-representative testing are
inadequate.
- As DOT&E has highlighted on numerous occasions, the F-35 relies on mission
data loads in order to be effective in detecting, identifying, geo-locating, and – if
necessary – responding to threats. These data loads are a compilation of mission
data files that drive sensor search parameters and provide the data required to
identify and correlate sensor detections of threat emissions, as well as files that
drive automatic or pilot-directed responses to threat engagements. The mission
data files (MDF) are developed by the USRL, which is tasked to provide them to
the Services, tailored for various geographic regions and multiple aircraft
configurations (i.e., Block 2B, Block 3i, and Block 3F).
- Significant deficiencies in the USRL preclude efficient development and testing
of the mission data files, but the program has yet to take adequate action to
address many of these deficiencies. Key hardware upgrades needed to develop
and verify Block 3F mission data files for detecting and identifying emissions
from current threat systems are still not on contract, despite the requirement being
identified and funding provided in 2012. It will take at least two years after
ordering the equipment, so the required equipment will not be in the lab in time to
support MDF development for IOT&E. Also, the software tools used for
developing, modifying and testing the files continue to be plagued by significant
usability shortfalls and a lack of adequate technical data.
- Consistent with these observations, the Air Force IRA report emphasized the need
for adequate resourcing for upgrades and sustainment of the USRL and
operationally-representative testing of mission data files.
Block 3F mission systems software required multiple corrections to deficiencies before
weapons delivery accuracy testing could begin. However, despite DOT&E asking the
program office for information on the extent to which these deficiencies exist in Block 3i,
this information is apparently still unknown.
The Air Force identified seven “Must Fix” deficiencies from Block 2B for the program to
fix in Block 3i to meet their IOC requirements. The program was able to adequately address four
of these seven deficiencies. Two of the remaining three showed improvement, but were not fully
resolved, and one remains unresolved. The status of these seven deficiencies is summarized in
the table below.
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какол, а ты сам то хоть прочитал? или на потреотическом форуме тебе сказали что нилитает?
constrains the effectiveness of the Block 3i F-35A for many CAS missions. Compared to
a legacy fighter with multiple weapons on racks, and multiple weapons types per aircraft,
.
За твои гнилые отмазки тебя бы давно поперли из цеха!
