Я не знаю, есть ли перевод этого доклада, поэтому даю ссылку на оригинал: 100 страниц с иллюстрациями и анализом.
As prior analyses by ARES and other organisations has consistently demonstrated, the recording and analysis of arms and munitions in conflict zones can provide a useful yardstick for the progress of a conflict. The original protests in late 2013 and January 2014 saw standard issue weapons in the hands of Ukrainian security forces, with few surprises. When Russian military units swept into Crimea in March, a shift was apparent towards modern Russian military weapons rarely seen on the export market, before the arms landscape again changed to depict the more rag-tag assemblage of older and expedient types now in use with pro-Russian militants in eastern Ukraine. It is clear that civilian weapons can and will be sourced by Ukrainian residents from their homes and from gun stores, but other sources are less clear. Limited illicit importation has certainly taken place. For example, there is no legitimate civilian means of ingress for many of the arms produced outside of Ukraine which have been documented in this report, including the ASVK and PKP recently observed, or indeed the several anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems identified as foreign.
ARES has assessed that it is very likely that pro-Russian separatist forces have received some level of support from one or more external parties, however the level of state complicity in such activity remains unclear. Despite the presence of arms, munitions, and armoured vehicles designed, produced, and allegedly even sourced from Russia, there remains no direct evidence of Russian government complicity in the trafficking of arms into the area
(Reuters, 2014c). The majority of arms and munitions documented in service with separatist forces have evidently been appropriated from the Ukrainian security forces and their installations within Ukraine.
The 1970s and 1980s vintage ex-Ukrainian military inventory is likely to continue to predominate. The various older and expedient types of arms and munitions outlined in this report should not be taken to mean that separatist forces are ill-equipped. Some of the more capable arms and munitions available to them have been outlined.
However, ageing light weapons systems and larger ordnance, along with MANPADS and other SAM systems, will all retain a niche amongst pro-Russian forces in Ukraine for as long as government forces maintain their overwhelming advantage in air power and armour. The Ukrainian regime has access to more powerful weapon systems, in greater numbers, and with a more robust logistical chain than separatist forces could hope to muster without overt support from a foreign power.
As it stands, the limited but noteworthy external support pro-Russian separatist forces have received has not proven significant enough to turn the tide in their favour. ПЕРЕВОД ВЫДЕЛЕННОГО ФРАГМЕНТА ТЕКСТАпророссийские сепаратистские силы получили определенный уровень поддержки от одной или нескольких внешних сторон, однако уровень государственного участия в такой деятельности остается неясным. Несмотря на наличие оружия, боеприпасов и БТС, произведенных и якобы даже поставленных из России, нет никакого прямого доказательства, что российское правительство участвует в торговле оружием в эту область. Большинство оружия и боеприпасов документально подтвержденных в наличии у сепаратистских сил, видимо, были захвачены у украинских сил безопасности и их складов в пределах Украины.ссылка на аннотациюссылка на весь доклад в формате pdf